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Synopsis: The adaptive pressures facing humans and other animals to make decisions quickly can be met
both by increasing internal information-processing speed and by minimizing the amount of information to
be used. Here we focus on the latter effect and ask how, and how well, agents can make good decisions
with a minimal amount of information, using two specific tasks as examples. When a choice must be made
between simultaneously-available options, minimal information in the form of binary recognition (whether
or not each item is recognized) can be used in the recognition heuristic to choose effectively. When options
are encountered sequentially one at a time, minimal information as to whether or not each option is the best
encountered so far is sufficient to guide agents using a simple search-cutoff rule to high performance along
several choice criteria. Both of these examples have important economic as well as biological applications,
and show the power of simple fast and frugal heuristics to produce good decisions with little information.
Key words: individual decision making; ecological rationality; information search; recognition heuris-
tic; sequential search; secretary problem; dowry problem; optimal stopping; cutoff rule; heuristic; search;
simulation
JEL Classification: D81 (Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty), D83 (Search, Learn-
ing, and Information), C60 (Mathematical Methods and Programming, General)
1 Introduction — Meeting the need for speed
Humans and other animals frequently must make decisions in as rapid a manner as possible. To
hesitate is often to be lost, whether this means losing an opportunity for a meal or a mate to a
competitor, or losing one’s life or limb to a predator or otherwise hostile environment. Organisms
seeking to make choices and take action as quickly as possible can either speed up the input side of
the decision process, reducing the time needed to gather information on which to base those choices,
or speed up the processing/output side, reducing delays in processing the information and converting
it into behavior. While evolution has developed faster processing mechanisms over the eons (e.g.,
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myelinization to increase nerve impulse travel speed), the greatest time advantage is likely to come
from reducing the amount of information sought before making a decision (Todd, 2000). But then
what kind of adaptive decisions can an organism make, and how useful can they be, with a minimal
amount of information?
In this paper, we present answers to these questions for two common but distinct types of de-
cisions: choosing between two simultaneously-available options, and choosing one option from a
string of sequentially-encountered possibilities. Both of these types of decisions are not only im-
portant for many adaptive problems faced by a wide range of species, but are also frequently seen
in more modern human domains studied by psychologists and economists. This means that the
minimal-information decision mechanisms for which we can find evidence in non-human animals
could also underlie aspects of human economic behavior.
We take here an evolutionarily inspired view of how decision-making mechanisms should work
and what they should achieve, leading to a focus on the need to minimize (or reduce as much as
possible) the amount of information that must be gathered and used in reaching an inference, the
importance of simplicity and speed in information processing, and the vital role of the environment
in providing structured information to enable rapid and accurate domain-specific decisions. This
view stands in sharp contrast to the vision of unbounded rationality, often defined by its adherence
to the laws of logic and probability theory, that forms the basis of proper economic behavior as em-
bodied in Homo economicus. The lofty goals and strict standards of unbounded rationality require
the use of complex decision-making machinery to process all available information, without regard
for costs or limitations in time, processing power, or knowledge. But in recent years an increasing
body of (experimental) evidence has shown that real humans often violate the principles of rational
behavior. This comes as no surprise from an evolutionary perspective, which holds that evolution
did not shape the mind to be rational per se, but rather to be well adapted to its environment.
Consider the typical economic task of choosing a particular brand of some product. A standard
(rational) economic approach to solve this problem would be to find out what all the available brands
are, search for all the relevant information about each brand, weigh the importance of each piece of
information according to one’s utility function, combine the weighted information to come up with a
final judgment for each brand, and choose the highest-valued one. From an evolutionary perspective
instead, we would consider the way that our minds were designed to deal with information about
multiple options (say, artifacts produced in different areas). This implies considering the structure
of the available information itself. For instance, in such situations information was probably incom-
plete (not all the available options were always known) and largely socially obtained (paying atten-
tion to the greater combined experiences of others), with the further implication that useful artifacts
would probably have been heard about more often than useless ones (because people would continue
to use the good ones and hence talk about them longer). Given this environment structure, we can
postulate that people could make good choices by simply selecting those items they had heard about
from others, rather than by personally paying the cost of investigating all the available possibilities
as in the standard economic approach described above. This leads to two testable predictions: first,
that people behave in this way (in particular settings), and second, that they make good choices
as a consequence. Exactly this has been proposed in the form of the recognition heuristic, which
we discuss in the next section.1 In a similar manner, we can apply the investigatory principles of
1Similar arguments underlie the investigation of a related mechanism, conformist transmission, in which people tend to
adopt the most common behavior exhibited in a population (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998); however,
this mechanism relies on more information, namely counts of behaviors, than just the minimal presence or absence of
recognition explored here.
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evolutionary psychology to propose and explore psychologically plausible mechanisms for making
decisions in other (modern) economic contexts.
To reach decisions and make choices in a reasonable amount of time, real agents must employ
limited search for information about available options (the first decision case we consider here) or
for options to choose between (the second case we consider), whereas models of unbounded ratio-
nality assume that search can go on indefinitely. In realistic models, search must be limited because
real decision makers have only a finite amount of time, knowledge, attention, or money to spend on
a particular decision. Limited search requires a way to decide when to stop looking for information,
that is, a stopping rule. One way to stop information search is to use a stopping rule that optimizes
search with respect to the time, computation, money, and other resources being spent. More specifi-
cally, this ‘optimization under constraints’ vision of rationality holds that the decision maker should
calculate the benefits and costs of searching for each further piece of information and stop search as
soon as the costs outweigh the benefits (e.g., Sargent, 1993; Stigler, 1961). This approach sounds
plausible at first glance. But a closer look reveals that optimization under constraints can require
even more knowledge and computation than unbounded rationality, as all of the costs and benefits
of all of the possible courses of searching or not searching for each further piece of information or
option must be calculated (Vriend, 1996).
Instead, search for information or options can be limited in a much simpler way, following the
tenets of bounded rationality. Herbert Simon proposed bounded rationality as consisting of two in-
terlocking components: the limitations of the (human) mind, and the structure of the environments
in which the mind operates. The first component implies that humans ‘must use approximate meth-
ods to handle most tasks’ (Simon, 1990, p. 6). These methods include recognition processes that
largely obviate the need for further information search, heuristics that guide search and determine
when it should end, and simple decision rules that make use of the information found. Simon’s
second component is also of crucial importance because it can explain when and why simple deci-
sion mechanisms perform well: if the structure of the mechanism is adapted to the structure of the
information in the environment. This leads to a new conception that proper reasoning must be not
only boundedly but also ecologically rational, arising from constrained decision mechanisms that
are matched (that is, adapted) to the particular structure of information in the environments in which
they are applied.
Evidence is growing that humans do indeed make decisions in an ecologically rational manner,
using as little information as possible and tailoring their information and option search to the struc-
ture available in the environment. Experts have been shown to base their judgments on surprisingly
few pieces of information (Shanteau, 1992). It has been found that people can trade off the effort
involved in making a choice against the accuracy of that choice, and choose a quick and simple
decision strategy that would achieve the desired balance (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). And
simple heuristics that use only a single piece of information to make a choice between two alterna-
tives have been discovered to rival the performance of much more complex and information-hungry
methods such as multiple linear regression (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
Thus, researchers interested in how people and other animals make many real-world decisions in
a rapid manner would do well to begin by looking at candidate ‘fast and frugal’ decision mechanisms
that could accomplish the job with a minimum of information and processing. In the rest of this
paper, we do just that for two simple cases: First, in the next section we briefly review work on
the recognition heuristic, which uses perhaps the least possible amount of information — whether
or not an option is recognized — to choose between simultaneously available options. Then in the
third section, we consider at somewhat greater length the problem of choosing one option from a
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sequence of possibilities seen one after another. In this decision situation, each possibility must
either be selected or rejected forevermore on the spot — there is no going back to previously-seen
options. This problem, commonly called the secretary problem, can be effectively solved by simple
mechanisms that use only the information of whether or not a current option is the best seen so
far. In both the cases we discuss here, the way information is structured in the environment allows
simple mechanisms to make good decisions despite ignoring most of the available information,
demonstrating how ecological rationality can work.
2 Choosing between options using recognition alone
One of the simplest kinds of choice — numerically, at least — is to select one option from two possi-
bilities, according to some criterion on which the two can be compared. What is the minimal amount
of information that an organism could use to make a reasonable choice in this case? Of course, the
organism could use no information at all, and just choose randomly — certainly this would be sim-
ple, and probably fast, but it would result in a good choice (i.e., selecting the better option in terms
of the criterion dimension) only half of the time on average. What is the least increase in information
that could allow an improvement over the random case?
Consider the situation in which the only information available is whether or not each option
has ever been encountered by the organism before. Then either this information is uncorrelated
with the criterion, in which case random choice remains the only option, or else recognition has
some (positive or negative) correlation with the criterion. In this latter case, the decision maker
can do no better than to rely on his or her own partial ignorance, choosing recognized options
over unrecognized ones (if the correlation is positive, or the reverse if it is negative). This kind
of ‘ignorance-based reasoning’ is embodied in the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer,
1999): When choosing between two objects (according to some criterion), if one is recognized and
the other is not, then select the recognized one. For instance, if deciding at breakfast-time between
a cheddar-cheese omelette and a durian-fruit compote (on the criterion of being good to eat), this
heuristic would lead (most Western) people to choose the recognized egg dish over the unrecognized
fruit offering.
As just indicated, the recognition heuristic will not work in every environment, but in some it
will be ecologically rational — that is, able to exploit environment structure to yield good choices
more often than would random choice. This will happen in all those decision environments in
which exposure to different possibilities is positively correlated with their ranking along the decision
criterion being used. (Again, negative correlations can also be exploited, by reversing the decision of
the recognition heuristic.) To continue with our breakfast example, using the recognition heuristic to
decide what to eat can be ecologically rational because those things that we do not recognize in our
environment are more often than not inedible — humans have done a reasonable job of discovering
and incorporating edible substances into our diet. (Those who know durian fruit may consider
its edibility debatable.) Norway rats follow a similar rule, preferring to eat things they recognize
through past experience with other rats (e.g., items they have smelled on the breath of others) over
novel items (Galef, 1987).
Goldstein & Gigerenzer (1999) have used a different kind of example to amass experimental
evidence that people also use the recognition heuristic: Because we hear about large cities more
often than small cities, using recognition to decide which of two cities is larger will often yield the
correct answer (in those cases where one city is recognized and the other is not). Employing the
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recognition heuristic can lead to the surprising less-is-more effect, in which less knowledge can lead
to more accurate decisions than does a greater amount of knowledge. More specifically, an inter-
mediate amount of (recognition) knowledge about a set of objects can yield the highest proportion
of correct answers, because it allows the recognition heuristic to be used more frequently (there are
more pairs where one item is recognized and the other is not) — knowing (i.e., recognizing) more
than this can actually decrease the decision-making performance (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999).
The recognition heuristic can be extended beyond picking one option from two, generalizing
to cases in which several options are to be chosen from a larger set of possibilities. For instance,
recognition can be called on when several social partners are to be chosen for some collaborative
activity such as resource exchange or hunting. Can the recognition heuristic also be put to work in a
modern-day equivalent of this type of choice, choosing companies for investment? When deciding
which companies to invest in from among those trading in a particular stock market, the recognition
heuristic would lead us to choose just those that we have heard of before. Such a choice can be
profitable assuming that more-often-recognized companies will typically have some of the better-
performing stocks on the market — a testable, but not obvious, assumption. For instance, people
can recognize a company because of news coverage of spectacularly poor performance as well. So
testing this assumption also entails answering whether recognition is more common for companies
through positive or negative associations.
This assumption has indeed been tested recently as a fast and frugal approach to investing
(Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999). Several sets of people were asked what com-
panies they recognized (but not whether positively or negatively), and investment portfolios were
formed based on the most frequently recognized firms. In this (short-term) trial of a minimal-
information heuristic in a complex and unforgiving real environment, the researchers found that
ignorance-driven recognition-based investment choices could beat the performance of professional
stock pickers and mutual funds. This study does not, by itself, prove that people use the recognition
heuristic when making such choices (though common investment advice suggests this is so) — it
only provides evidence that using this heuristic can be a surprisingly adaptive strategy in the stock
market environment. Experimental examination of whether (and if so when) people employ the
recognition heuristic in this and other domains remains an important challenge.
3 Searching through sequential options
The recognition heuristic can help agents make good choices with a minimum of information when
confronted with multiple options to choose between simultaneously. But many of the important
decisions we face are not structured this way — rather, we often must choose between a set of options
that we do not see all at once, but one after another, sequentially. This happens for instance when we
are trying to find the best price on tomatoes as we drive from store to store, or when we are looking
for a parking space outside each store. More importantly, we often encounter potential jobs one by
one, or meet potential mates in a sequence, or find potential dwellings spread out over time. These
situations are typically characterized by low (or zero) probability of being able to recall, or return
to and choose, previously-seen options once they have been passed by (e.g., houses on the market
one month will probably be sold by the next — for California, divide the time-scale by 100). The
problem then becomes one of deciding when to stop searching and go with the currently-available
option.
How can we make a good choice in such a sequential setting? The best way, assuming no costs
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for time spent searching, would be to find out what all the available options are, compute which one
is best according to the choice criteria, and then wait until that option comes along. Of course, such
full knowledge is rarely available. Instead we might know the distribution of possible values of the
options we might encounter, and we might have a limited number of possible options that we can
check, in which case we can compute the optimal point to stop search so as to balance the gain from
the particular chosen option against the risk of missing a better option later on (DeGroot, 1970). But
what is the minimal amount of information that could be used for these sequential choices? This is a
difficult (perhaps ill-defined) question to answer, but one possible approach is the case in which only
a single bit’s worth of information is registered for each option, corresponding to whether (bit = 1)
or not (0) the current option is the best one seen so far (i.e., if it is a ‘candidate,’ in the terminology
used below). Then, each sequence of possible options would be conceived of as a binary string of
1’s and 0’s, and the decision maker would have to decide where to stop (usually on a 1).2 This
minimal-information formulation of the sequential search problem underlies a fair amount of earlier
work in this area (though sometimes not explicitly). Given this framework, we now want to ask,
how can a decision maker go about finding a good option, and how well will the decision maker be
able to do?
As we will see, the answers all depend on what our definition of ‘good’ is. We start with
perhaps the most widely studied version of this sequential search problem, in which ‘good’ is defined
as having a high probability of finding and choosing the single best applicant in the available set
of options. This version is known in probability theory as the secretary (or dowry) problem. In
the secretary problem it is the searcher’s aim to find the (one) best of N applicants for a job as a
secretary, with the assumption that they can all be arranged on a single dimension of overall quality.
The applicants are presented to the searcher sequentially in a random order and the searcher has
no knowledge about the distribution of the applicants’ quality values. With each new applicant, the
searcher learns the quality (or current rank in the strictest version) of this applicant, and then must
choose between stopping the search and thus hiring the current applicant or continuing the search
to look for a better applicant. If the searcher continues she cannot go back and choose an earlier
applicant — that is, there is no ability to ‘recall’ past applicants in this search.3
To maximize the chance of selecting the best applicant in the secretary problem setting, the
searcher should sample the first 37% of the applicants and then select the first candidate thereafter
who is better than all previous applicants. (See Ferguson, 1989, for a review of the literature on the
secretary problem and this optimal solution.) One simple way to do this is to set an aspiration level
equal to the quality of the best applicant seen so far, and then after 37% of the applicants have been
seen, fix this aspiration level and use it to stop the search with the next applicant seen who exceeds
that aspiration — an approach akin to Simon’s (1990) notion of satisficing.
Thus, given that the searcher knows the optimal 37% sample size — which assumes that the
searcher first knows the total number of applicants that could be encountered — following this 37%
2Note that a fair amount of processing may have to go into determining the value of the best-so-far? cue for each op-
tion, comparing its criterion value to that of the previous best-so-far candidate (which must therefore be stored somehow);
but the same is true of the recognition heuristic, which makes use of a simple binary recognized? cue that must itself be
computed with further (potentially complex) machinery such as a face recognition mechanism. We are interested here
in the simpler higher-order cognitive decision mechanisms that can be built upon the outputs of possibly more complex
lower-level mechanisms including perception and categorization — see Todd (1999).
3These assumptions restrict the set of search situations that the secretary problem can reasonably model; others, e.g.,
Hey (1982), and Moon & Martin (1990), have explored decision rules that can be used in those situations where full
recall is possible or further assumptions are relaxed, and heuristics for the case of mutual or two-sided mate choice are
considered by still others, e.g., Todd & Miller (1999), and Bergstrom & Real (2000).
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rule is simple. The searcher must only keep in memory the optimal sample size (37%) and the
quality of the best applicant seen so far. With each new applicant seen, a simple pair of comparisons
(about the applicant’s quality, to yield the best-so-far? cue, and its position number) is sufficient
to decide whether to stop or continue search. But a simple rule does not necessarily imply that
the actual search is short. On the contrary, the 37% rule leads to long searches: The first 37% of
applicants are always searched through, and 37% of the time the search will go to the very end of the
applicant pool, because the best option was already observed during the sample phase. On average
the searcher examines 74% of the applicants before making a final choice. And even more striking,
the simple rule does not guarantee great success: The 37% rule fails to find the best applicant in the
whole set 63% of the time (i.e., it only succeeds 37% of the time). But no other rule can do better —
at least not on this criterion of success. (Later we will consider other, possibly more reasonable,
criteria for measuring search performance.)
While applying the 37% rule is simple, its derivation is not. First, it is not immediately obvious
that the general approach of sampling a certain number of applicants, setting an aspiration level
based on that sample, and then picking the next encountered applicant who exceeds the aspiration
level thereafter is indeed the optimal procedure. Second, the fact that for large N → ∞ the optimal
sample size (for setting the aspiration level) approaches 1/e ≈ 0.368 is also not intuitive. (But see
Mosteller, 1965, for a clear explanation of why the 37% rule is the optimal strategy.) Obviously it
is unrealistic to assume that humans faced with such a search problem actually derive this optimal
rule and then follow it. At this point economists often argue that while humans do not actually carry
out such complicated calculations they still act as if they were doing them. But this still leaves us
with the question of how people actually do make these kinds of search decisions (such as in the
secretary problem) and how well they do given a particular definition of success (such as the optimal
approach described here). We now turn to a review of past research on people’s performance on the
secretary problem, and mechanisms that have been proposed to account for the observed patterns of
behavior.
3.1 Experiments on the secretary problem
Several experimental investigations of the secretary problem have indicated that the 37% rule is not
the best explanation of observed behavior — that is, people do not seem to be acting optimally in this
setting. Kahan, Rapoport, & Jones (1967) conducted some of the earliest experiments in this area. In
their studies, participants had to search for the largest of 200 different numbers that were presented
one by one. They had no knowledge of the underlying distributions, and no ability to recall (return
to) previously-seen numbers. Overall Kahan et al. found that up to half of all participants searched
less than directed by the 37% rule. The researchers suggested that people could instead be using a
subjective cut-off rule, which fitted the observed behavior rather well. This rule says to stop search
on any number that is far enough (in terms of standard deviations) above the mean of the previous
offers — but note that this requires knowing much more than just the binary best-so-far? cue (i.e.,
all the actual values), and thus goes beyond the strict definition of the secretary problem.
Corbin, Olson, & Abbondanza (1975) ran a study that showed that such a cutoff model does
not adequately explain some observed search behavior. In particular, they wanted to show that the
exact order in which applicants (or options) are seen can exert an effect on the stopping behavior
of searchers — even though standard notions of rationality (and the 37% rule) indicate that order of
encountered options should not matter for deciding when to stop. In their setup, participants had to
find the highest of five numbers presented sequentially on cards, again with no recall possible, in
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each of 120 trials. Subjects were told that the numbers were drawn randomly, though this was not
true. In half of the trials the second card was higher than the first, thus making it a ‘candidate’ (de-
fined as a number that is the highest seen so far, and thus a possible stopping point when searching
for the highest value). These 60 trials were prepared such that this candidate was low (around 50),
medium (around 500) or high (around 4400) in 20 trials for each level (‘magnitude’ differentiation).
Moreover, in each of these three groups the first card was either extremely low or extremely high
relative to the second (‘history’ differentiation). In 40 of the 120 trials the third card was a ‘can-
didate’. These 40 trials were also arranged in groups concerning the ‘pattern’ (relation of first to
second card), ‘magnitude’ (of third card) and ‘history’ (size of first two cards relative to the third).
The remaining 20 trials used rank orders that were not under special examination but were left in the
study to ensure that participants would not develop a bias for stopping at a certain position. (Again,
the inclusion of magnitude and history information departs from the standard secretary problem, but
relevant conclusions can still be drawn from the effects of candidate pattern.)
For trials in which the second card was a candidate, there was a clear tendency for its magnitude
to increase the probability that search would be stopped at this point. These candidates were also
significantly more often chosen after a low history (low first value seen) than after a high history.
Similar strong effects were observed for magnitude, history and pattern when the third card was a
candidate. Pattern was especially important: Whenever the second value was lower than the first
and the third was higher than both (making a down-up pair of transitions, or a 1–0–1 pattern of
best-so-far? cue values), participants almost always stopped on the third value. In comparison,
when there was a monotonic increase from the first to the third card (a 1–1–1 pattern), the third
card was picked only rarely, even though the 37% rule would direct searchers to stop at that point.
Corbin et al. related their findings to the idea that people use general heuristics for solving this
problem — for instance, the magnitude of the current observation (in absolute terms, or relative to
the entire experiment, or relative to the trial’s previous observations) and the trend of the previous
observations have a strong impact on the decision of the participants. What is not made clear is
what those heuristics might be, and how particular patterns would exert influence on participants’
decisions to stop or continue a search.
The results from both Kahan et al. (1967) and Corbin et al. (1975) show that people do not
typically follow the 37% rule. As we noted above, however, the original secretary problem assumes
no knowledge of the distribution. While participants in the experiments just described did not know
anything about the distribution when they started their search, they did see actual number values
throughout their search and thus could learn at least something about the underlying distribution they
were searching from, thus violating one of the secretary problem’s assumptions. This problem was
avoided by Seale & Rapoport (1997), who were the first to experimentally investigate the original
form of the secretary problem. In their secretary-hiring setting, only the relative rank of those
applicants interviewed so far was revealed, rather than some real value.
Seale & Rapoport regarded the optimal 37% rule solution of the secretary problem as only a
benchmark and put more emphasis on finding simple heuristics that would be a better explanation
of the actual behavior of the participants in their studies. They proposed three such heuristics,
namely a cutoff rule, a candidate count rule and a successive non-candidate rule. The cutoff rule
is a generalization of the optimal solution, where searchers simply pass by a certain number r− 1
(not necessarily the optimal number) of applicants and then hire the next encountered top-ranked
applicant (so the 37% rule is a cutoff rule with the cutoff set at 37% of the possible alternatives).
As defined before, each applicant that is top-ranked at the moment of being interviewed (i.e., when
the option is assessed) is termed a candidate. The candidate count rule then simply implies choos-
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ing the jth candidate seen. The successive non-candidate rule on the other hand chooses the first
candidate that is interviewed after observing at least k consecutive non-candidates — that is, it stops
searching after the gap between successive candidates has grown sufficiently large. All of these
heuristics demand only minimal cognitive requirements (mainly counting and computing the best-
so-far? cue), and thus are simpler than Kahan et al.’s subjective cut-off rule that must calculate
means and standard deviations; but they can account for only some of the order effects found by
Corbin et al. (1975).
Seale & Rapoport (1997) first showed by means of Monte Carlo simulations that their proposed
heuristics can be very effective at finding the best applicant, in comparison with the benchmark
37% rule.4 With the best parameter choice, the cutoff rule is by definition identical to the optimal
solution (i.e., when the cutoff is set to 37; all trials here recalculated with N = 100 applicants) and is
thus successful in 37% of the search trials. But even with small to medium deviations of the cutoff
parameter, e.g. cutoffs between 26 and 50, this rule still robustly finds the best candidate in more
than 35% of the trials. The successive non-candidate rule also achieves a very high success rate
of more than 35% by setting the threshold for gap-size between candidates to the best value of 19.
In contrast, the candidate count rule is successful in only 21% of the trials with the best parameter
choice (stop on the 5th candidate). (These results can be seen in both Figure 1 and Table 1, described
later.)
Next, Seale & Rapoport compared the predictions of the three search heuristics with the actual
behavior of their participants when searching through sequences of 80 values (presented as relative
ranks). The cutoff rule was most successful in this regard, being most consistent with observed
search behavior (accounting for between 41% and 74% of the decisions made) for 21 out of 25
participants. The successive non-candidate rule gave the best fit for 8 of the 25 (equalling the
performance of the cutoff rule for some participants), while the candidate count rule best accounted
for only one participant’s decisions.
Seale & Rapoport (2000) extended this work to the case where the number of applicants N is
ex-ante unknown — instead, the participants only knew that the number of applicants was randomly
chosen between 1 and some upper bound U . The optimal solution in this case is to follow a cutoff
rule akin to the optimal solution of the standard case, looking at 13.5% of U and choosing the first
candidate thereafter. The chance of finding the best applicant overall is then slightly above 27%. In
this setting, most results are very similar to those for the original secretary problem. The strategies
again perform very close to the optimal success rate (equalled by the cutoff rule), with the candidate
count rule reaching 25% and the successive non-candidate rule 27%. Again the cutoff rule is best at
explaining the observed behavior of the participants in the experiment.
One of the key results in both of these studies (similar to those of Kahan et al., 1967) is the
observation of early stopping: A majority of the participants stopped earlier than prescribed by the
optimal solution. As a consequence, the human searchers had success rates of 30–32% (compared to
37%) in the 1997-study and 21–25% (compared to 27%) in the 2000-study. Seale & Rapoport (1997)
offer one possible explanation for this early stopping, arguing that participants would stop before the
optimal point if they were including endogenous search costs in their stopping decisions. According
to Seale & Rapoport’s calculations, the modal observed behavior would be the optimal search length
if participants calculated in a search cost at every step of 1% of the value of selecting the best
applicant (or 3.5% in the modified unknown-N version). Note that this does not necessarily imply
4Seale & Rapoport report performance “efficiency” and “effectiveness” in terms of the ratio of a strategy’s success
rate to the success rate of the optimal rule, but here we just report success rates.
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that people are embodying a fully rational approach by actually calculating with search costs —
they could still be using a simple rule, mindless of costs, that leads to shorter searches and thereby
produces behavior in line with the optimal search length incorporating costs. Another explanation
for early stopping could be provided by the order effects found by Corbin et al., a possibility we are
currently exploring.
The fact that people search too little in these experiments may also indicate that they are not
understanding the problem in the same way that experimenters intend it, or that they are behaving
in ways more appropriate for search situations that they typically encounter. So to better understand
how living agents can perform sequential search with minimal information, we should think again
about the search tasks that they would naturally face — how many of these adhere to the form of
the secretary problem? Probably not too many. As mentioned earlier, there may be some possibility
of recalling past alternatives, or some costs to search, or some uncertainty about the number of
available alternatives, or some knowledge about the available distribution (as could be learned in
the Kahan et al., 1967, and Corbin et al., 1975, studies). Such modifications to the search situation
have been studied both analytically to find optimal solutions (e.g., Corbin, 1980, for search with
varying possibilities of recall, Seale & Rapoport, 2000, for the case with an uncertain number of
possible alternatives) and experimentally to see how people behave in these settings (e.g., Schotter
& Braunstein, 1981). The first three factors have predictable effects — greater costs and greater
uncertainty lead to shorter searches, and the ability to recall leads people to go stop when costs
grow too large and go back to the best option previously seen. More interesting is the finding that
more information has little effect on individuals’ search behavior (Schotter & Braunstein, 1981),
providing support for our investigation of minimal-information search strategies. What has been
less explored is the effect of a fifth factor: The payoff function for the search itself. As we noted
earlier, the definition of what is ‘good’ search performance can have an impact on what search
strategies are appropriate. Thus, we should now ask what payoff functions, or searcher goals, are
likely to be used? And how well can different minimal-information search strategies meet those
goals?
3.2 Searching with broader goals
To repeat, how and how well a searcher can find good options using the minimal best-so-far? cue
depends on the searcher’s definition of a good option. In the secretary problem, the single best option
was the only good one. But this strictest-possible payoff function would be found in few natural
situations. In many species, most animals find some mate, some food source, and some place to
live (and indeed most companies find some secretary), and thus receive some payoff, even if not the
highest possible payoff. Thus in these cases, a payoff proportional to the quality of the alternative
chosen (e.g., the typing speed of the hired secretary) is more appropriate than the all-or-none payoff
of the standard secretary problem. For other species, available alternatives (e.g., mates or habitats)
may be limited so that not everyone can succeed in making a viable choice — for instance, only
a quarter of the possible habitats in which one could settle may provide enough resources to raise
offspring. In such cases, the search payoff function could fully reward only choices made in the top
25% of all available alternatives and give zero payoff to all other choices.
Todd & Miller (1999) considered these questions by taking the original secretary problem (in the
equivalent dowry problem form for mate choice) as a starting point and broadening the goal of the
searcher to biologically more realistic settings. They used Monte Carlo simulations to examine how
the cutoff rule (which they called Take the Next Best) performs in the usual secretary problem search
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setting, but with a variety of different payoff measures. These included payoff proportional to the
mean value of chosen alternatives (across multiple searches), payoff only for finding an applicant
in the top 10% or in the top 25% of the population, and payoff only for finding an applicant that is
not in the bottom 25% of the population (i.e., avoiding the worst possible alternatives). For each
of these measures, Todd & Miller assessed the length of search, in terms of cutoff point, needed to
maximize the chance of meeting the particular goal (or maximizing the mean payoff value for the
first goal).
In the first set of simulations the number of applicants was fixed at N = 100. As stated earlier,
the goal of finding the single best applicant requires first checking 37% of the applicant population
before setting the aspiration level, and it succeeds only 37% of the time. But when the goal is
changed to maximizing the average value of the chosen applicant, much less search is needed to
achieve the best possible performance: here Todd & Miller found that an aspiration-setting cutoff
at 9% of the applicants led to the maximum average value of chosen applicants (equal to 92 out of
100 given applicant values evenly distributed from 1 to 100). For the other new goals, again little
search was needed and the rate of success was much higher (see Table 1 entries for the cutoff rule
for a summary of these results, which vary slightly from those originally reported by Todd & Miller
owing to random fluctuations).
To test how these search times are affected by a change in the number of available applicants,
Todd & Miller ran a second set of simulations with N = 1000. Whereas for the original secretary
problem goal the optimal solution is still the same (cutoff= 37%), the best cutoff values for the other
goals do not grow in a similarly linear (percent-based) manner. Instead, with this larger N only 1–
3% of the population need be looked at to set an aspiration level for finding ‘good’ applicants (see
Table 1). Based on these findings, Todd & Miller proposed an even simpler (cutoff-style) heuristic,
applicable for a wide range of N, which they call ‘Try a dozen’: Take the first applicant that is
better than the best of the first 12 applicants. This heuristic neither needs to assess the expected total
number of possible alternatives N, nor compute a percentage of that number, to perform reasonably
well on the variety of goals Todd & Miller considered. (This is in contrast to the optimal 13.5%
cutoff rule for the standard secretary problem with an unknown number of applicants between 1 and
N, which was carefully explored by Seale & Rapoport, 2000.)
How well do Seale & Rapoport’s other two rules perform on these different goals? We extended
their simulations to find out, using 100 applicants. We computed the average length of search
required for different parameter values of all three heuristics (e.g., how long would one need to
search on average with a candidate-count parameter of 5?), and plotted this against success of each
heuristic on each goal. (In contrast, Seale & Rapoport looked at the number of correct selections
versus parameter values; but because the three heuristics use different parameters, we chose to look
at total search time instead to allow direct comparison between heuristics.) First, in Figure 1, we
show success on the standard secretary problem goal of selecting the single best applicant. As
Seale & Rapoport (1997) found, the cutoff and successive non-candidate rules are very close in
performance — similar search lengths yield similar levels of success — while the candidate count
rule lags behind. For the goal of picking an applicant in the top 10% (Figure 2), the striking result
is that the already small difference in performance between the cutoff rule and the successive non-
candidate rule decreased even further, with the cutoff rule succeeding in 81% of the trials while the
successive non-candidate rule reached 80% success, after a mean search length of 43. Finally, when
maximizing the mean value of the applicant selected (Figure 3), the pattern looks about the same,
but with maximum success being reached with less search.
The performance comparison for all three rules on the five goals, for both N= 100 and N= 1000,
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Table 1: Results of an extended Monte Carlo simulation, following Seale & Rapoport (1997)
and Todd & Miller (1999), comparing the performance of three search heuristics on five goals
(selecting the single best applicant, an applicant in the top 10% of the quality ranks, in the
top 25%, avoiding the bottom 25%, or maximizing the mean quality value selected). For each
rule and goal, entries are shown for the best parameter value found (i.e., yielding the highest
success); the mean success of the rule on that goal given the best parameter value, in percent
of time the goal was achieved or percent of quality range returned for the Max Mean goal;
and mean total search length given the best parameter. All results are computed over 100,000
rounds.
GOAL
Top 1 Top 10% Top 25% Not Bottom 25% Max Mean
N = 100 APPLICANTS
Cutoff Rule
Best Parameter Value 37 15 9 4 10
Mean Success in % 37 82 92 99 91
Mean Search Length 73 42 29 14 31
Successive Non-Candidate Rule
Best Parameter Value 20 8 4 1 5
Mean Success in % 35 80 91 99 90
Mean Search Length 71 43 28 13 32
Candidate Count Rule
Best Parameter Value 5 4 4 3 3
Mean Success in % 21 64 81 98 84
Mean Search Length 59 38 38 19 19
N = 1000 APPLICANTS
Cutoff Rule
Best Parameter Value 354a 33 15 5 33
Mean Success in % 37 97 99 100 97
Mean Search Length 722 143 74 27 143
Successive Non-Candidate Rule
Best Parameter Value 194 19 9 2 18
Mean Success in % 35 96 98 100 97
Mean Search Length 695 150 85 29 144
Candidate Count Rule
Best Parameter Value 7 5 4 3 4
Mean Success in % 16 83 92 99 92
Mean Search Length 526 210 100 36 100
aThe cutoff rule with parameter 354 led to 36,719 correct choices in 100,000 simulation rounds, while parameter
value 371, closer to the theoretical optimum, produced 36,718 correct choices — indicating the flat maximum in
































Figure 1: Performance of three search rules (see text) for the goal of selecting the single best appli-
cant out of N = 100 applicants (simulation results computed over 100,000 rounds). For each value
of the parameters r, k, and j, a point determined by the success of the corresponding rule with that
parameter value and the mean search length using that rule with that parameter value is plotted, with
all points for each rule connected by a line. The specific parameter value that yields the greatest
number of correct selections is highlighted for each rule (see also Table 1).
is shown in Table 1. Here we can see, as Todd & Miller (1999) found, that a ten-fold increase in the
number of available applicants results in only a doubling to tripling of parameter values and search
length needed by the cutoff and successive non-candidate count rules to maximize performance
on the new measures (slightly more for the mean value criterion). The candidate count rule still
performs least well at N = 1000, though the gap has narrowed — but more surprisingly, it does
this with little or no change in parameter values (e.g., choosing the fourth candidate works best for
finding an applicant in the top 25% for both N = 100 and N = 1000, though the mean search length
increases because the maximum search length is so much longer in the second case). Still, an agent
with no knowledge of N (at least in the range 100 to 1000) would do better picking a low parameter
value (e.g., 12) for one of the other two rules, which outperform the candidate count rule over a wide
parameter range on all of the criteria.
Another real-world feature that we should consider in searching for ecologically rational search
rules is the fact that sequential choice environments are often not static and stable. Rather, the
distribution from which available options are drawn may change over time. For example, as (or if)
one gets older and wealthier, the set of available and attainable options to consider when buying
a car or a house (or attracting a spouse) may increase in value as well. Conversely, if the pool
of available options shrinks over time, like unattached dance partners at a party or unsold lots left
in a new housing development, the distribution of quality may also fall over time. How well will


































Figure 2: Performance of three search rules for the goal of selecting an applicant in the top 10% of
the quality ranks of all N = 100 applicants (simulation results computed over 100,000 rounds and






























Figure 3: Performance of three search rules for the goal of maximizing the mean value of the selected
applicant (simulation results computed with N = 100 applicants over 100,000 rounds and displayed



















































Figure 4: Performance of three search rules (see text) for the goal of selecting an applicant in the
top 10% of the quality ranks of all N = 100 applicants, but with the distribution from which the
applicants are drawn changing over time, either descending by 100% (peaks on left) or ascending
by 100% (peaks on right) over the course of the 100 applicants (simulation results computed over
100,000 rounds and displayed as in Figure 1 but with different y-axis range).
To find out, we have simulated the three rules discussed so far in a range of settings where the
distribution of available values shifts over time. Here we report results for two environments: one
in which the distribution of values rose by 100% over the course of the 100 items that could be
seen (i.e., item values were drawn from the uniform distribution (0.01, 1.01] for the first item, (0.02,
1.02] for the second item, (0.03, 1.03] for the third, and so on up to (1.0, 2.0] for the 100th), and one
in which the distribution of values fell by 100% over the 100 items (i.e., from (-0.01, 0.99] for the
first to (-1.0, 0.0] for the 100th).
In Figure 4 we show the results of the three search rules, for the goal of selecting an applicant
in the top 10% of the quality ranks of all N = 100 applicants, in both the ascending and descending
environments. In the ascending environments, all three rules not surprisingly must search much
longer than in the static environment case (Figure 2) because the best applicants will tend to come
at the end of the overall-rising sequence. What is more surprising is that, while the cutoff rule still
does the best (achieving 99% success with r= 79), the candidate count rule now greatly outperforms
the successive non-candidate rule. The reason for this is that the environment structure does not
match the “expectations” of the latter rule, causing its performance to suffer: In a rising sequence,
new candidates are encountered often, and the gap between them does not grow sufficiently to
allow appropriate triggering of the non-candidate rule. The opposite problem plagues all three rules
equally in the descending environments: New candidates are rarely encountered as the sequence
falls overall, so the rules must stop search as quickly as possible (e.g., with r = 2 for the cutoff rule,
which yields a 68% success rate). Rules that could stop search on applicants that are not candidates
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would clearly fare better in these environments.
3.3 Searching for further answers
In general, in stable environments where possible options are encountered independently, one after
another, with no knowledge of their distribution and no recall available, searchers can be ecolog-
ically rational by simply using the best-so-far? cue with the cutoff (or successive non-candidate
count) rule and a low parameter value. This approach (e.g., ‘Try a dozen’) is a simple way to per-
form well, according to multiple criteria, in sequential search. However, its empirical match to
observed behavior remains to be determined. In a preliminary study, we have observed that people
change their search behavior appreciably when directed to search with different goals. We had 29
participants search 9 sequences of 100 numbers (positive integers drawn uniformly from different
ranges) with three different goals. Each person thus saw three sequences for each goal, with the first
for each goal being a practice run. The three goals (and their corresponding payoff conditions) were:
select the highest of the 100 values (and receive payoff only if successful), select a number in the
top 10% of the values in the current sequence (again receiving payoff only if successful), or select
a high number (receiving payoff proportional to how high the selected number was in the current
sequence).
How did participants search in these three different conditions? For the first goal (select highest),
the mean search length was 41 and the success rate was 18%; for the second goal (select in top 10%),
the mean search length shortened to 28 while the success rate grew to 95%; and for the third goal
(select a high value), the search length shrank further to 24 and the selected value was on average at
the 94th percentile of the possible range (with 79% of the selections landing in the top 10% of the
range). Thus people seemed to adapt their strategy to the particular search goal they were presented
with, rather than using a single simple rule as suggested by the ‘Try a dozen’ approach. Further
experiments of the sort done by Seale & Rapoport are needed to determine just what strategies were
used in each case.
Not only can it be reasonable to adapt one’s search strategy to the particular situation at hand,
but it also can be advantageous to adapt one’s strategy over the course of a particular single search.
For instance, if the final search horizon is approaching and a suitable option has not yet been found
(possibly leading to ‘end-panic’), then lowering one’s aspiration level can be sensible to increase
the chances of making a choice before it is too late. Such an adaptive strategy has been proposed
for animals searching for mates during a fixed breeding season — as the end of the breeding season
looms, aspiration levels should drop, because any mating opportunity is better than none (Johnstone,
1997). For a modified secretary problem setting with the specific goal of finding one of the three
highest values in a sequence of (for instance) 100 numbers, Quine & Law (1996) derived the optimal
strategy, which also relies on falling aspiration levels: First follow the cutoff rule presented earlier
with r= 33 until either search is stopped at a candidate or the 58th applicant is seen; after this point,
stop on any best-so-far or second-best-so-far applicant until the 78th applicant is seen; from that
point on, select any applicant qualifying in the best three so far. In additional simulations, we have
found that similar adaptive cutoff rules can increase search performance considerably on the search
goals (aside from selecting the single highest) we considered here.
To make further progress studying the psychological mechanisms that people use in sequential
search tasks, we must continue to combine three main approaches. First, we need to identify a set
of plausible mechanisms that could be used in different settings, something that can be done with
simulation and mathematical analysis. We are currently exploring a range of environments (e.g.,
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with different and time-varying distributions of values) and variations in agents’ knowledge of them
(e.g., whether they observe just the best-so-far? cue, or ranks, or actual values) to find what heuristics
can be ecologically rational in those settings. Second, we need to perform laboratory experiments
in which we look for evidence of the use of particular proposed mechanisms. And third, we must
gather empirical observations of decision making in real-world sequential search situations (such as,
when driving, choosing which rest area to pull over and stop at, or when stocking a warehouse with
goods whose price varies on a daily basis, choosing when to buy new supplies — see Bolle, 1979),
to gain more evidence about how people actually behave in these tasks.
4 Conclusions
Good decisions can be made with little information. Here we have shown how simple binary values,
whether or not something is recognized or is the best option seen so far, can be sufficient when
paired with appropriate heuristics operating in appropriately-structured environments to yield high
performance on choice and search tasks. Other examples of this general trend abound; for instance,
when more information than just recognition is available about two available options (and hence the
recognition heuristic cannot be applied), simply tallying the number of pro and con attributes for
each choice (Dawes, 1979) or even basing choice on a single distinguishing attribute (‘one-reason
decision making’ — Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) can rival appropriately-weighted processing of
all information.
In fact, in contrast to the usual image, handed down from traditional views of rationality, that
more information will always be better, recent research has begun turning this notion on its head by
showing ways in which less information can actually lead to greater decision-making performance
(Hertwig & Todd, in press). We saw this in the less-is-more effect with the recognition heuristic;
another example is simple heuristics leading to more robust generalization performance on new data
sets (which may also hold for the sequential search tasks we have examined here). Thus, people and
other animals may not only suffer little from using ecologically rational strategies to make decisions
with minimal information, they may even gain an edge.
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